The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims by Bennett, Thomas B.
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Minnesota Law Review 
2021 
The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Over Federal 
Claims 
Thomas B. Bennett 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bennett, Thomas B., "The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims" (2021). 
Minnesota Law Review. 3211. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3211 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
































Oakland	 in	particular,	 for	 thoughtful	editing.	 I	owe	a	particular	debt	of	gratitude	 to	


















This	 is	 a	 paradox.	 The	 classic	model	 assumes	 that	 federal	 law	
should	 be	 decided	 mainly	 in	 federal	 court,	 or	 at	 least	 that	 federal	











































dicial	 federalism	 produce	 an	 outcome	 at	 best	 bizarre	 and	 at	worst	
harmful	to	the	integrity	of	federal	law.9		
The	 paradox	 teaches	 two	 lessons,	 one	 narrow	 and	 one	 broad.	



















































by	 ideological	 opposition	 to	 the	 plaintiffs’	 bar.11	 But	 proper	 under-








novel	 jurisdictional	 limitations	 have	 unintended	 consequences.	 For	
that	reason,	every	proposal	to	resolve	the	paradox	that	does	not	re-
store	 pre-Spokeo	 jurisdictional	 limits	 bumps	 up	 against	 some	 im-
portant	principle	of	our	federal	judicial	system:	legislative	supremacy,	
the	distinction	between	jurisdiction	and	merits,	the	requirement	that	















































crete	 injury	 under	 Article	 III,	 which	 serves	 to	 bar	 certain	 federal	
statutory	claims	from	being	litigated	in	federal	court.	In	particular,	a	
large	and	growing	number	of	statutes	promoting	diverse	consumer-
protection	 goals	 such	 as	 data	 privacy,	 identity	 theft,	 and	 accurate	
credit	 reports	 are	 increasingly	 held	 to	 be	 unenforceable	 in	 federal	















nation	 than	 is	 readily	perceived.”);	see	also	 id.	(“The	 frequently	neglected	problems	
posed	in	the	administration	of	federal	law	by	state	courts.”).	









defendants	 reside	 and	 have	 jurisdictional	 contacts.	 For	 defendants,	
who	are	typically	the	ones	who	argue	for	dismissal	based	on	stand-
ing,16	the	prevailing	state	of	affairs	is	ironic	because	defendants	gen-
erally	 prefer	 to	 litigate	 in	 federal	 court17	 but	 have	 relegated	 them-










statutes	 that	 include	 such	 provisions	 are	 47	 U.S.C.	 §	605(e);	 the	 Fair	 and	 Accurate	
Credit	Transactions	Act	of	2003,	15	U.S.C.	§	1681n(a)	(the	statute	at	issue	in	Spokeo);	
the	Fair	Debt	Collection	Practices	Act,	15	U.S.C.	§	1692k;	the	Stored	Communications	
Act,	 18	U.S.C.	 §	2707(c);	 the	Telephone	Consumer	Protection	Act	 of	 1991,	 47	U.S.C.	
§	227(b)(3)(B);	the	Truth	in	Lending	Act,	15	U.S.C.	§	1640(a)(2)(A);	and	the	Worker	
Adjustment	and	Retraining	Notification	Act,	29	U.S.C.	§	2104(a)(3).	For	an	overview	of	

















	 18.	 See	Robert	 J.	 Herrington,	Think	 Twice	 Before	 Seeking	 Dismissal	 for	 Lack	 of	
















































275,	290–99	 (2008)	 (describing	 the	 ebb	and	 flow	of	 the	doctrine	 in	 terms	of	 court	
makeup);	Jonathan	Levy,	Comment,	In	Response	to	Fair	Employment	Council	of	Greater	
Washington,	Inc.	v.	BMC	Marketing	Corp.:	Employment	Testers	Do	Have	a	Leg	to	Stand	
On,	 80	MINN.	L.	REV.	 123,	 129–34	 (1995)	 (describing	 standing	 as	 originating	 in	 re-




















standing	doctrine	was	an	 invention	of	modern	 judges,	not	 the	 founders.	See	 John	A.	
Ferejohn	&	Larry	D.	Kramer,	Independent	Judges,	Dependent	Judiciary:	Institutionaliz-
ing	Judicial	Restraint,	77	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	962,	1009	(2002)	(asserting	that	the	Supreme	







































the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 continually	 added	 additional	 doctrinal	 re-
quirements.	 The	 injury	 must	 be:	 “actual,”	 “imminent,”	 “particular-





has	 been	 voluminous,	 though	 it	 has	 not	 succeeded	 in	 moving	 the	
Court.	The	traditional	critiques	of	standing	doctrine	are	that	it	 is	by	













































requirement	 down	 its	 restrictive	 path,	 typically	 in	 cases	 divided	
sharply	 along	 partisan	 lines.32	 The	 newest	 developments—and	 the	




requirement	 of	 particularization	 are.	 Whereas	 particularization	 is	
about	whether	the	plaintiff	has	suffered	an	injury	more	acute	than	has	








nent	 injury	 can	 be	 sufficient	 later,	 once	 it	 has	 become	more	 proxi-
mate.35	 A	 hypothetical	 injury	 can	 be	 sufficient	 if	 a	 plaintiff	 can	 be	
found	who	suffered	it.36	In	the	same	way,	the	concept	of	particulariza-




































sponse,	 several	 environmental	 and	wildlife-conservation	nonprofits	
sued	to	block	the	change	pursuant	to	the	so-called	“citizen-suit”	pro-




turn	 injured	 them	because	 they	 could	 not	 enjoy	 the	 observation	 of	





ment	 or	 use	 from	 damage	 to	 endangered	 species	 or	 their	 habitats	
qualified	as	sufficient	injury	for	Article	III	purposes.46	But	the	Court	
disagreed	that	 the	plaintiffs	 themselves	particularly	 felt	such	a	 loss.	
Plaintiffs’	members	claimed	to	have	visited	Egypt	and	Sri	Lanka	and	





















jury	was	not	particularized.49	 In	other	words,	 the	plaintiffs	 failed	to	

























































ever	 stated	 in	 dicta—let	 alone	 held—that	 concreteness	 required	
something	separate	from	particularization.55	By	setting	the	require-
ments	of	 concreteness	 and	particularization	apart,	Lujan’s	 formula-
tion	thus	subtly	expanded	the	doctrinal	test	for	standing.	By	enumer-





plaintiff	 has	 a	 statutory	 right,	 she	 does	 not	 necessarily	 also	 have	
 
	 53.	 Id.	at	560	(emphasis	added)	(footnote	omitted)	(citations	omitted).	


































Yet	 the	 concreteness	 prong	 remained	 vague	 because	 of	 the	
Court’s	finding	that	the	plaintiffs’	theory	of	standing	failed	to	satisfy	
the	 particularization	 prong.59	 There	 were	 therefore	 two	 lingering	
questions	about	the	concreteness	requirement	after	Lujan,	one	broad	
and	one	narrow.	First,	and	more	generally,	it	was	unclear	what	sorts	
























































allows	 users	 to	 search	 for	 individuals	 by	 name,	 email	 address,	 or	
phone	number.70	Search	results	can	include	information	about	an	in-
dividual’s	 age,	 address,	marital	 status,	occupation,	household	value,	
wealth,	and	“economic	health.”71		
 





















The	 plaintiff,	 Thomas	 Robins,	 learned	 that	 the	 information	
Spokeo	maintained	 about	 him	was	 factually	 inaccurate.72	 Although	
Spokeo	 correctly	 listed	 his	 address	 and	 even	 siblings’	 names,	 it	 in-
cluded	inaccurate	information	about	his	age,	marital	status,	employ-




eral	 law.75	Robins’s	 complaint	alleged	 that	he	was	 “concerned”	 that	
such	“inaccuracies”	would	“affect	his	ability	to	obtain	credit,	employ-
ment,	 insurance,	 and	 the	 like.”76	 He	 alleged	 to	 be	 particularly	 con-








Robins’s	 sole	 injury	 was	 his	 speculative	 and	 hypothetical	 concern	
about	 future	harm,	 rather	 than	 any	 statutorily	 defined	harm.81	 The	




The	 Ninth	 Circuit	 reversed,	 per	 Judge	 O’Scannlain.83	 Judge	



























gument,	 vacated	 and	 remanded.85	 The	Court,	 per	 Justice	Alito,	 held	
that	the	Ninth	Circuit’s	analysis	properly	asked	whether	Robins’s	in-









































apparently	 reasoned	 that	 such	 cases	 were	 distinguishable	 because	








ond	 round	of	briefing	on	 the	question	of	 concrete	 injury	 in	 light	 of	
Spokeo,	even	though	the	issue	of	standing	was	not	addressed	below.94	
After	 considering	 eight	 supplemental	 briefs	 from	 the	 parties	 and	
amici,	the	Court	issued	a	brief	opinion	vacating	the	judgment	below	
for	further	proceedings	to	address	the	“wide	variety	of	legal	and	fac-
tual	 issues	 not	 addressed	 in	 the	merits	 briefing	 .	.	.	 or	 at	 oral	 argu-
ment,”	including	“[r]esolution	of	the	standing	question.”95	And	in	an-





















ing	 racial	discrimination	 in	housing,	 so	 the	 right	here	at	 stake	 is	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	
FCRA’s	goal	of	protecting	consumers	against	dissemination	of	inaccurate	credit	infor-
mation	about	them.”	Id.	at	1555	n.3.	





















federal	 court	 system:	 plaintiffs	 generally	 are	 free	 to	 bring	 federal	
claims	in	state	courts,	which	control	their	own	jurisdiction.	The	basic	
logic	 of	 this	 arrangement	 is	 apparent	 from	 the	 Supremacy	 Clause,	
which	makes	“the	Laws	of	the	United	States	.	.	.	the	supreme	Law	of	the	
Land”	 and	 mandates	 that	 “Judges	 in	 every	 State	 shall	 be	 bound	
thereby.”101	Because	federal	law	binds	state	judges,	they	must	apply	it	
in	 cases	 that	 present	 it.102	 Put	 differently,	 the	 Supremacy	 Clause	
makes	federal	law	a	part	of	the	law	of	every	state,	meaning	that	state	
courts	must	apply	 it	 just	as	 they	would	 their	own	 laws.	 Indeed,	 the	
 
	 97.	 See	Allison	Grande,	Spokeo	Helps	Consumer	Return	FCRA	Claims	to	State	Court,	





























sonian	 Compromise103—a	 fact	 that	 highlights	 state	 courts	 as	 im-
portant	 adjudicators	 of	 federal	 claims	 in	 the	 constitutional	 system.	
Other	than	when	Congress	specifies	exclusive	federal	jurisdiction,	the	
only	limit	on	plaintiffs’	ability	to	bring	federal	claims	in	state	court	are	
the	 states’	 own	 justiciability	 rules—for	 example,	 standing	 doctrine	
under	state	law.104	
Subject	to	the	proviso	that	they	may	not	discriminate	against	fed-
















































standing	 law	 is	often	a	shadow	of	 its	 federal	 counterpart.109	This	 is	
surprising.	No	state	constitution	imposes	the	“case	or	controversy”	re-
quirement	 that	 the	 federal	 Constitution	 does.110	 Thus,	 state	 courts	
could	develop	unique	justiciability	doctrine	consistent	with	their	own	
constitutional	text	and	history.111		



















rupt”);	Episode	396:	Your	Emails,	 Answered,	Effectively	Wild	 (Feb.	28,	 2014)	 (down-
loaded	using	Overcast)	(answering	question	from	listener	Vinit,	“If	baseball	were	dif-



















State	 courts’	 reaction	 to	Lujan	 shows	 this	pattern	well.	As	dis-
cussed	in	Section	A	above,	Lujan	was	influential	in	large	part	because	





State	 courts’	 varied	 reception	 to	 Lujan’s	 revised	 standing	
doctrine	led	to	a	kaleidoscope	of	state	standing	rules.	Figure	1	maps	
that	kaleidoscope.118	 Each	 state	has	been	 categorized	along	 two	di-





























That	 state-by-state	 variation	 creates	 ambiguity	 and	 disuni-
formity	 about	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 valid	 forum	 for	 federal	 statutory	
claims.	To	be	sure,	the	diversity	of	state-court	 jurisdictional	rules	is	
 















claims.	 In	particular,	 these	suits	asserted	claims	under	 the	Fair	and	
Accurate	Credit	Transactions	Act	of	2003	(FACTA)122	alleging	that	the	
















FECT	 SOLUTIONS:	 STATES	 AND	 THE	MAKING	 OF	 AMERICAN	 CONSTITUTIONAL	 LAW	 174–78	
(2018),	which	argues	against	“lockstepping,”	“the	tendency	of	some	state	courts	to	di-
minish	 their	 constitutions	by	 interpreting	 them	 in	 reflexive	 imitation	of	 the	 federal	
courts’	interpretation	of	the	Federal	Constitution”;	Joseph	Blocher,	Reverse	Incorpora-
tion	of	State	Constitutional	Law,	84	S.	CAL.	L.	REV.	323,	339	(2011),	which	notes	 that	
































































This	 example	 shows	 how	 the	 viability	 of	 federal	 claims	 varies	
both	between	federal	and	state	court	and	among	various	state	courts.	
It	also	shows	why	plaintiffs	cannot	simply	shop	for	the	friendliest	state	












rules	 as	 applied	 to	 FACTA	 in	 the	wake	 of	 Spokeo.	 And	 again,	 state	
courts	are	split	on	whether	to	allow	them.	In	North	Carolina,	the	de-
fense	 bar	 won	 a	 significant	 victory	 when	 a	 state	 trial	 court	 cited	
Spokeo	to	dismiss	FACTA	claims	for	failure	to	allege	injury	in	fact,	de-
spite	North	Carolina’s	more	liberal	standing	doctrine.137	Meanwhile,	
in	 Illinois,	 an	 intermediate	 state	 appellate	 court	 rejected	 FedEx’s	
 







































Though	we	 don’t	 yet	 know	 how	 the	 post-Spokeo	map	 of	 state	
standing	 doctrine	 will	 look,	 we	 have	 already	 seen	 different	 states	
reach	 different	 conclusions.140	 That	 means	 many	 types	 of	 FACTA	
claims	 and	 related	 statutory-damages	 suits	 can	 be	 brought	 only	 in	
state	courts,	and	only	in	certain	states.	The	only	federal	review	is	by	
the	 Supreme	 Court—and	 under	 the	 Court’s	 decision	 in	ASARCO,	 to	
which	we	turn	in	a	moment—this	occurs	only	if	the	plaintiff	wins	in	















































ment	 (Second)	of	Conflict	of	Laws,	which	seeks	somewhat	 in	vain	 to	create	a	set	of	




eral	courts	at	adjudicating	 federal	constitutional	claims.	Much	of	 that	 literature	dis-
cusses	whether	federal	or	state	courts	are	superior	at	protecting	individual	liberties.	
Compare,	 e.g.,	 Burt	Neuborne,	The	Myth	 of	 Parity,	 90	HARV.	L.	REV.	 1105,	 1116	n.45	
(1977)	(arguing	that	federal	courts	are	superior	fora	for	vindicating	civil	rights),	and	
Akhil	Reed	Amar,	A	Neo-Federalist	View	of	Article	III:	Separating	the	Two	Tiers	of	Fed-
eral	 Jurisdiction,	 65	B.U.	L.	REV.	205,	230	n.86	 (1985)	 (arguing	 that	 the	Framers	 in-
tended	federal	courts	as	the	primary	guarantors	of	federal	constitutional	rights),	with	
William	 B.	 Rubenstein,	 The	 Myth	 of	 Superiority,	 16	 CONST.	 COMMENT.	 599,	 607–12	
(1999)	(arguing	that	gay	rights	would	never	have	been	expanded	to	their	current	am-








































































































the	 law);	 Scott	 Dodson,	Personal	 Jurisdiction	 and	 Aggregation,	 113	 NW.	U.	L.	REV.	1	
(2018)	(arguing	that	personal	jurisdiction	has	arisen	as	a	de	facto	limitation	on	aggre-
gate	litigation).	
	 149.	 See	generally,	 e.g.,	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co.	 v.	 Superior	Ct.,	 137	S.	Ct.	 1773	





































Action	 Fairness	Act	 of	 2005,	which	made	 it	 substantially	 easier	 for	
class-action	defendants	to	remove	state-law	class	actions	with	mini-
mal	 diversity.156	 And	 conventional	wisdom	holds—supported	 by	 at	





















found	 that	defendants	were	more	 than	 twice	 as	 likely	 to	win	 in	 re-
moved	cases	as	in	unremoved	cases	in	both	state	and	federal	courts.158	
It	 is	 deeply	 ironic	 that	Spokeo	bars	 defendants	 from	 removing	
many	federal	consumer	class	actions.	It	was	defendants	who	litigated	
the	 issue	of	Article	 III	 standing	so	vigorously	 in	Spokeo	 and	related	
cases.	 In	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 there	were	 ten	 certiorari-stage	 briefs	
supporting	Spokeo,	including	from	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	two	of	
the	three	major	credit	reporting	agencies,	and	a	consortium	of	 tech	
giants	 including	 eBay,	 Facebook,	 Google,	 and	 Yahoo!.159	 The	merits	
stage	added	another	seven	amici	supporting	Spokeo.160	By	contrast,	
Robins	 was	 supported	 at	 the	 merits	 stage	 exclusively	 by	 privacy	








federal	 district	 court.163	 That	 gambit	 reveals	 one	 advantage	 for	 de-
fendants	of	litigating	such	cases	in	federal	court:	ease	of	centralization	

























Scottrade’s	 lawyers	 likely	celebrated,	but	 their	celebration	was	
premature.	Two	subsets	of	 the	 losing	plaintiffs—those	 from	Florida	
and	California—refiled	identical	claims	in	state	court,	represented	by	











dismissed	 it	 on	 res	 judicata	 grounds.171	 But	 the	 California	 federal	
court	agreed	with	the	Missouri	court	that	the	plaintiffs	lacked	stand-
ing.	Rather	than	dismissing—as	the	Missouri	court	had	and	as	Scot-















































court.	The	Court’s	 focus	 in	both	cases	was	on	 the	consequences	 for	
federal	 rather	 than	 state	 dockets.	 As	we	will	 see,	 those	 unforeseen	
costs	are	dear.	And	though	it	is	tempting	to	identify	eventual	Supreme	
Court	review	as	a	saving	grace,	the	asymmetric	availability	of	that	re-






















vocate	 that	 the	 best	 course	 is	 exclusive	 cross-jurisdictional	 alloca-











Federal	Courts,	 87	CALIF.	L.	REV.	 1409,	1411,	1467–68	 (1999)	 [hereinafter	Schapiro,	
Polyphonic	Federalism]	(advocating	the	adjudication	of	state	constitutional	issues	by	
federal	 courts	 as	 a	means	 to	 facilitate	 development	 of	 the	 law);	 Geri	 J.	 Yonover,	A	
Kinder,	 Gentler	Erie:	 Reining	 in	 the	Use	 of	 Certification,	 47	ARK.	L.	REV.	 305,	 337–39	
(1994)	 (cataloguing	 advantages	 of	 cross-jurisdictional	 decision-making);	 Ann	 Alt-
house,	How	To	Build	a	Separate	Sphere:	Federal	Courts	and	State	Power,	100	HARV.	L.	
REV.	1485,	1505–06	n.116	(1987)	(arguing	that	state	decisions	on	federal	law	can	“in-
form	and	enrich”	 the	ultimate	uniform	interpretation	of	 those	 laws	by	the	Supreme	
Court);	William	M.	Landes	&	Richard	A.	Posner,	Legal	Change,	Judicial	Behavior,	and	the	
Diversity	Jurisdiction,	9	J.	LEGAL	STUD.	367,	386	(1980)	(“Contrary	to	the	conventional	
view,	we	 find	that	 the	 federal	courts	 in	diversity	cases	appear	to	make	a	significant	
contribution	to	the	continuing	development	of	the	common	law.”	(citation	omitted)).	
	 178.	 See	Friedman,	supra	note	5,	at	1236	(“One	is	likely	to	find	little	disagreement	







































clusive	 final	 jurisdiction	 over	 federal	 claims	 as	 “a	 hydra	 in	 govern-
ment,	 from	 which	 nothing	 but	 contradiction	 and	 confusion	 can	




the	 allocation	 of	 cases	 as	 between	 state	 and	 federal	 courts	 have	
reached	the	same	conclusion.	The	American	Law	Institute’s	landmark	











stitutional	 law,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 avoiding	 a	 federal	 constitutional	 ruling	 that	
would	end	any	chance	for	further	dialogue	on	important	constitutional	matters.”);	Da-
vid	L.	Shapiro,	Federal	Diversity	Jurisdiction:	A	Survey	and	a	Proposal,	91	HARV.	L.	REV.	




upon	 conflict	 and	 indetermina[]cy”	 that	 “obtains	whenever	 jurisdictional	 rules	 link	

















cur	 considerable	 costs	 to	 comply	with	 conflicting	 regulations.	 They	
will	also	face	substantial	legal	and	compliance	costs	from	the	unpre-
dictability	that	would	attend	fifty-one	interpretations	of	federal	stat-


















































Second,	 the	 Supreme	Court	 is	 restricted	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 ensure	
uniformity	 in	these	kinds	of	cases	because	 it	can	only	take	them	on	
appeal	if	the	plaintiff	won	in	state	court	below.189	This	odd	asymmetry	
derives	 from	the	Court’s	attempt	 to	grapple	with	 its	own	Article	 III	
justiciability	limitations,	even	though	the	state	courts	it	reviews	follow	
different	rules.	In	a	pair	of	cases,	the	Court	addressed	whether,	when	
cases	 involving	plaintiffs	who	 lack	Article	 III	standing	appear	on	 its	
appellate	docket,	it	can	hear	the	case.	By	giving	seemingly	contradic-
























































allegedly	“erroneous	 interpretation	of	 federal	statutes”	and	inflicted	concrete	 injury	
upon	 them,	 the	Court’s	 exercise	 of	 jurisdiction	was	proper.	 Id.	 at	 618–19	 (majority	
opinion).	In	essence,	the	Court	treated	the	petition	for	certiorari	as	the	invocation	of	
federal	jurisdiction	and	thus	tested	the	petitioner’s	injury	against	Article	III.	
	 196.	 See	Hall,	 supra	note	 9,	 at	 1272–78	 (tracing	 the	 development	 of	 this	 asym-
metry);	see	also	Schapiro,	supra	note	9,	at	304	(“Thus,	if	a	non-Article	III	plaintiff	re-







































































which	 here	 are	 that	 jurisdictional	 elements	 are	 unwaivable	 and,	 at	
least	in	theory,	must	be	raised	by	the	court	sua	sponte	if	unaddressed	
















that	 fact	 is	 resolved	 in	 the	adjudicative	process.	The	 second	 is	 formalist—Congress	
treats	jurisdiction	and	merits	differently	in	its	various	statutory	enactments	and,	in	a	

















































	 207.	 See	G.	ALAN	TARR,	UNDERSTANDING	STATE	CONSTITUTIONS	3	(1998)	(“[I]t	 is	the	
state	constitution—and	not	 the	 federal	Constitution—that	creates	 the	state	govern-
ment,	largely	determines	the	scope	of	its	powers,	and	distributes	those	powers	among	
the	branches	of	the	state	government	and	between	state	and	locality.”);	see	also	ALBERT	




































































The	 first	 proposal	 in	 the	 scholarly	 literature	 is	 to	 have	 state	
courts	follow	Article	III	standing	doctrine,	at	least	when	adjudicating	
federal	 claims.214	Proponents	of	 this	approach	 include	Paul	Freund,	
Judge	William	Fletcher,	and	Michael	Morley,	 though	each	advocated	





















LOUIS	U.	L.J.	473,	498	(1981)	 (“[J]usticiability	of	all	 federal	 issues	 in	state	or	 federal	
courts	should	be	controlled	by	article	III	principles.”);	Jonathan	D.	Varat,	Variable	Jus-
ticiability	and	the	Duke	Power	Case,	58	TEX.	L.	REV.	273,	311–13	(1980)	(discussing	the	










































he	does	not	 focus	on	 the	precise	 source	of	 authority	 to	 impose	 the	
case-or-controversy	 requirement	 on	 state	 courts,	 he	 advocates	 for	
“the	Supreme	Court	to	recognize	.	.	.	the	values	served	by	the	‘case	or	









































preme	Court,	and	 in	such	 inferior	Courts	as	 the	Congress	may	from	
time	to	time	ordain	and	establish.”225	It	is	hard	to	understand	how	the	



































































as	 a	 textual	 matter,	 no	 federal	 statutes	 require	 proof	 of	 Article	 III	
standing	as	an	element	of	 the	cause	of	action	on	the	merits.	And	as	
discussed	in	Section	I.B	above,	where	Congress	is	silent	on	the	issue,	
an	 established	 presumption	 supports	 concurrent	 jurisdiction,	 and	
Congress	has	long	legislated	against	that	background	presumption.231	
So	for	the	vast	majority	of	statutory	claims,	there	is	every	reason	to	
believe	 Congress	 intended	 to	 allow	 suit	 in	 state	 courts	with	 liberal	


















of	 action,	Congress	must	 .	.	.	 affirmatively	divest	 state	 courts	of	 their	presumptively	
concurrent	jurisdiction.”); Robb	v.	Connolly, 111	U.S.	624,	636 (1884)	(“In	establishing	




























eral	 cause	 of	 action	 outside	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 federal	 district	
courts	is	itself	unconstitutional.	But	it	is	not	the	creation	of	the	cause	
of	action	 that	would	be	 the	constitutional	problem;	 it	 is	 the	 federal	
court’s	proceeding	to	judgment	that	must	be	avoided.	If	federal	courts	
dismiss	Spokeo-type	claims,	 there	 is	no	constitutional	problem.	And	
absent	a	 constitutional	problem,	 there	 is	no	 reason	 to	 frustrate	 the	
clear	congressional	intent	to	remedy	the	harm	targeted	by	the	crea-










troversy	 requirement,	 which	was	 jurisdictional	 and	 not	 eliminated	
until	 1980.237	 Before	 then,	 it	was	 clear	 that	wide	 swaths	 of	 federal	
















when,	 as	 a	matter	 of	 history,	 did	Professor	Morley’s	 proposed	pre-
sumption	take	effect?	Not	in	1789,	when	the	entire	edifice	of	federal	
statutory	law	depended	on	state	courts	for	enforcement.239	Nor	could	
it	 plausibly	 be	 in	 1875,	 when	 small-dollar	 federal	 claims	 were	 in-
tended	to	be	state-court	actions.240	Perhaps	it	arose	in	1980,	upon	the	









state	 jurisdiction	 can	 unseat	 the	 presumption	 that	 state	 courts	 can	









islatures	when	reading	statutes.	 It	 is	one	 thing	 for	 federal	courts	 to	
abnegate	 power	 to	 hear	 cases	 outside	 their	 jurisdiction.	 Indeed,	
judges	denying	themselves	the	power	to	hear	cases	out	of	due	respect	
for	the	appropriately	 limited	role	of	the	federal	 judiciary	has	a	 long	




























































	 247.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Dice	 v.	 Akron,	 Canton	 &	 Youngstown	 R.R.	 Co.,	 342	 U.S.	 359,	 361	
(1952)	(“[T]o	deprive	railroad	workers	of	the	benefit	of	a	jury	trial	where	there	is	evi-
dence	to	support	negligence	‘is	to	take	away	a	goodly	portion	of	the	relief	which	Con-


















ferent	 structural	 considerations.252	Many	 state	 courts	might	 rightly	
wonder	why	they	must	change	their	jurisdiction	to	accommodate	in-
creasingly	 restrictive	 federal	 jurisdiction.	The	normative	bite	of	 the	
appeal	 therefore	 violates	 the	 second	 structural	 principle	 outlined	
above:	the	distinct	sovereignty	of	states	and	their	concomitant	power	
to	organize	their	sovereignty	as	they	see	fit.	











































































confer	 Article	 III	 standing.	 Many	 law	 professors	 have	 taken	 that	
view.258	But	as	the	Supreme	Court	has	gone	further	down	the	road	of	




















be	 no	 disagreement	 that	 allowing	 unlimited	 citizen	 suits	 in	 federal	




































ernmental	action,	 is	 the	particularization	requirement.	 In	Lujan,	 the	
problem	with	the	plaintiffs’	case	for	standing	was	that	they	could	not	





















1067	 (2018);	 Samuel	 Bray,	Multiple	 Chancellors:	 Reforming	 the	National	 Injunction,	
131	HARV.	L.	REV.	417,	418	(2017).	But	cf.	Mila	Sohoni,	The	Lost	History	of	the	“Univer-











that	 reason,	 the	 particularization	 requirement—or	 some	version	 of	














standing	 law	 creates	 a	 class	 of	 plaintiffs	 shut	 out	 of	 federal	 court,	
Spokeo	creates	a	class	of	federal	claims	shut	out	of	federal	court	and	
relegated	 to	 the	exclusive	 jurisdiction	of	 state	 courts—if	anywhere.	
Before	Spokeo,	the	potential	cost	was	felt	by	individual	plaintiffs.	Now	























it	 satisfied	 by	 procedural	 statutory	 violations—while	 retaining	 the	
particularization	requirement—is	the	only	way	to	untie	the	Gordian	
knot.	First,	as	noted,	it	retains	the	separation-of-powers	protections	
that	have	animated	standing	doctrine’s	development.	 Second,	 it	 en-
sures	that	every	statutory	violation	can	be	vindicated	by	at	least	one	
plaintiff:	the	one	who	feels	the	harm	most	sharply.	Third,	it	respects	


















holding	 in	Spokeo.	Against	 this	 idea,	William	Baude	has	argued	that	
treating	concreteness	as	satisfied	by	particularized	injuries	fits	with	a	






















that	would	be	 enough	 for	purposes	of	Article	 III.274	 Yet	Baude’s	 at-
tempt	 to	 read	 Spokeo	 permissively	 seems	 inconsistent	 with	 the	
Court’s	disposition	in	the	case:	vacatur	and	remand	for	consideration	
of	the	concreteness	prong	of	Article	III	injury.275	Indeed,	Baude’s	ad-


















ity	 of	 avoiding	 inadvertent	 doctrinal	 acceleration	 of	 the	 paradox’s	
costs.		
 
	 273.	 See	Baude,	supra	note	269,	at	231.	
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